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Inspired by Patrick Wolfe’s differentiation of the structures of colonialism and settler 
colonialism, scholars have proposed various theoretical models for understanding the 
dynamics of power within the settler colonial situation.1  Lorenzo Veracini has identified the 
core dynamics of this situation in his description of the triangular relationships between 
settlers, ‘exogenous Others’ and ‘indigenous Others’.2  These relationships, suggest Caroline 
Elkins and Susan Pederson, multiplied in the twentieth century, particularly in colonies in 
which settlers ‘had to contend with increasingly opinion-sensitive metropoles and indigenous 
majorities that could neither be decisively defeated nor be made to go away’.3  In these 
conditions, argue Elkins and Pederson, a four-way relationship developed between the 
imperial metropole, the local administration, the indigenous population and the settler 
community.4  Such multipolar relationships undoubtedly shaped the practices and 
mechanisms of colonial rule in French Algeria, where, in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries European settlers constituted a demographic minority in a territory ruled over by a 
highly centralised French state.  Settler colonialism in Algeria consequently shared a number 
of the features identified by scholars in other contexts, including attempts to ‘transfer’ the 
indigenous population, the elaboration of an enduring ‘pioneer myth’, the insistence on the 
distinct cultural – or racial - character of the settler community, and a drive towards a form of 
pluralistic settler sovereignty.5 
Although a number of scholars of settler colonialism include Algeria as a point of 
reference, its difference and exceptionalism as a settler colony are frequently noted.6 In 
Algeria, James Belich states, ‘the settler transition was always partial’.7 The historical 
specificities of the French Algerian context – including the heterogenous origins of the 
European population, the complex apparatus of the colonial government, and the exodus of 
settlers at the point of Algerian independence – have limited specialists of settler colonialism 
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in their engagement with the colonial territory.  The bloody denouement of French Algeria, 
where structures of settler colonial domination were ultimately disrupted by the uprising of 
Algerian nationalists and the departure of the European population, may not, moreover, offer 
a salutary example to politically-engaged scholars who seek to resolve the tensions of present-
day settler colonial situations.  
For their part, scholars of French Algeria have long been constrained by a French 
republican historiographical tradition which has tended to reduce the examination of settler 
colonialism to a politically-charged interrogation of settlers’ allegiance to the French nation.  
During the Algerian War, the historical questioning of settlers’ claims to ‘Frenchness’ served 
to displace responsibility for acts of colonial violence.8 In the decades following the end of the 
conflict and the ‘repatriation’ of settlers to the metropole, counter-arguments emerged 
insisting on the complete and unambiguous ‘francisation’ of the European population of 
Algeria during the Third Republic.9 Shaped by their respective conditions of production, these 
opposing historical narratives converged in their defense of French republicanism, and their 
ultimate affirmation of the binary opposition of ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’.10 Although such 
interpretations have been challenged in recent decades, as scholars question the very notion 
of ‘Frenchness’, and examine its construction in French Algeria,11 there have as yet been few 
attempts to engage explicitly with the propositions of settler colonial studies, as it has 
emerged as a field of research in the twenty-first century.12     
Yet, as this special issue argues, a much greater appreciation of the unstable status of 
Algeria as a settler colony is essential to both scholars of settler colonialism and Franco-
Algerian relations alike. Thus, in exploring the similarities and differences of the Algerian case, 
the articles in this collection make a specific contribution that connects the specificity of 
French Algeria to the generic of settler colonialism.  They show that by standing back and 
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placing French Algeria within a much broader debate about settler colonialism our 
understanding of French Algeria is significantly deepened and vice-versa.    Viewed through 
the analytical framework of settler colonialism, questions of sovereignty, identification and 
demographic composition emerge as central to the historical understanding of not only the 
politics, but also the mentalities, behaviours and emotions of the various communities in 
Algeria and the French metropole. In using these questions to understand the dynamics of 
power in French Algeria, these articles also seek to open fresh lines of enquiry in other settler 
colonial settings.  Questions of cultural exchange and multilingual expression amongst settlers 
of diverse European origin, for example, cannot be easily overlooked in the Algerian context, 
but rarely feature in histories of ‘the British World’ or ‘the Anglo World’, despite the disparate 
provenance of the European population.13 In providing such points of comparison this special 
issue aims outlines the model for a globally connected and comparative history of settler 
colonialism which examines the exchanges and contacts between multiple colonial empires.14 
Settler society in French Algeria was never a static object. It was an unfolding entity 
that was first made possible by the French invasion of 1830. In the ensuing years it would go 
through a number of phases before coming to a dramatic end point with Algerian 
independence in 1962. Nor was settler society a bloc. It was shot through with differences of 
class, gender, national origin and regional background. This internal diversity created complex 
hierarchies of power and ambivalent forms of settler identification. There was no single 
overarching settler narrative but rather a series of intersecting, often paradoxical, narratives 
that shifted according to the socio-historical moment. In trying to map the fluctuating 
relations that existed in different historical phases of settler colonialism in Algeria it is useful 
to think in terms of the dynamics which played out between six interconnected forces, the 
first of which was the French state. The state itself was not a single component, but rather a 
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multiplicity of institutions, each of which had different views about the governance of French 
Algeria. Initially, the French Army provided the driving force for the invasion and annexation 
of the territory. Thereafter the interests of the French state were always crucial, ultimately 
becoming the decisive factor when de Gaulle adhered to a process of decolonisation in April 
1961.    
The structures of local rule provided a second force in the dynamics of settler 
colonialism in Algeria. Despite significant overlap, local authorities were never simply an 
extension of the metropolitan administration. The dissonance of metropolitan and local 
authority created significant tension within the operation of colonial power. Settler leaders 
frequently sought to bend Paris-appointed officials to their will and, if unsuccessful, 
maneuvered to remove them. Such interactions reflected a deeply held suspicion of the 
government in Paris, particularly evident in the settler protests of the 1890s. These protests 
lead to the creation, in 1901, of the Délégations financières, a local assembly which enjoyed 
some measure of budgetary independence under the auspices of a French state. As David 
Prochaska remarks, ‘the unintended consequence of the French Third Republic applying 
liberal democratic institutions to Algeria was the opportunity it gave the settlers to create 
their own independent power base.’15 Settler representatives defended their limited 
autonomy, expecting the state to protect the colony, without interfering in its affairs. Highly 
conservative, these representatives acted alongside the deputies elected from the colony to 
the French National Assembly to sabotage proposals for political change in the twentieth 
century.    
The dynamics of power were further influenced by the wider settler community. This 
community was internally fractured by intersecting hierarchies of class and national origin. A 
tiny minority of settlers grew rich upon the profits of export agriculture, whilst the vast 
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majority were poorer than their contemporaries in mainland France. Although settlement was 
frequently represented as a process of making a barren land bloom, particularly in the marshy 
Mitidja area just south of Algiers, most settlers lived in the coastal towns and cities. Those 
who had fled from Alsace-Lorraine following German annexation in 1871 found themselves at 
the apex of a system of social privilege, above other Frenchmen, Italians and Spaniards, and 
settlers from Malta, who were perceived to occupy a liminal cultural and racial space which 
separated Europeans from Berbers and Arabs. Political and social inequality was the 
cornerstone of settler society. Following legislation in 1889, most Europeans in Algeria – 
regardless of origin – had the rights of French citizens, whilst the Arabo-Berber majority was 
governed according to a separate legal code. Limited interaction between settlers and the so-
called ‘indigènes’ contributed to a deeply ingrained settler racism that was particularly hostile 
to any sign of Arabo-Berber social and political advancement.  
Arab, Berber and Algerian Jewish populations constituted a fourth force shaping the 
dynamics of settler colonialism. In the decades following the French invasion, settler leaders 
and commentators anticipated the disappearance of these populations, through demographic 
decline or communal segregation. The demographic resurgence of these populations from the 
end of the nineteenth century, however, meant that by 1936 the Arabo-Berber population 
stood at 6 million, in comparison to the settler minority of 1 million. As forms of Arabo-Berber 
political organisation diversified from the turn of the twentieth century, settler leaders 
directed their energies towards ensuring the political and social privilege of the European 
minority. Fear of Arabo-Berber incursions on settler privilege also contributed to a strong 
strain of anti-Semitism in settler society. The enfranchisement of the Algerian Jews by the 
republican government in 1870 met continued and violent opposition from settlers, who 
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feared that this concession would ultimately lead to citizenship for the Arabo-Berber majority, 
and the end of French Algeria. 
The struggle over the rights and status of the Arabo-Berber majority involved a fifth 
voice, that of metropolitan public opinion. Settlers were sensitive to metropolitan perception 
of colonial society from the mid nineteenth century onwards, though this perception itself 
was based on a limited knowledge of the colonial territory, largely derived from primary school 
lessons, the 1930 centenary celebrations or the 1931 Colonial Exhibition. While settlers sought 
to distinguish themselves from the French of the metropole, they also lamented the lack of 
knowledge which they felt underpinned metropolitan ‘Arabophilia’, and exhorted observers 
on the other side of the Mediterranean to celebrate the settler community as defenders of 
the French empire. The Algerian War, and the concern it generated for the fate of French 
conscripts, transformed public understanding of colonial conditions, providing a determining 
factor in the mobilisation of the metropolitan public in favour of de Gaulle’s decolonisation 
narrative from 1961.       
The dynamics of settler colonialism in Algeria were crucially influenced by a sixth 
factor: the changing international context. This dimension of the settler colonial situation is 
yet to receive sustained attention from scholars, though work on the international 
perspectives of the Algerian War demonstrates its importance.16 Conscious of imperial rivalry 
in North Africa in the nineteenth century, and the development of international revolutionary 
movements in the twentieth century, French colonial authorities attempted to insulate 
Algerian society from outside influences. Settler journalists too, sought to regulate links 
between the local settler community and their various countries of origin, all the while 
denouncing external agitators, from Ottoman spies in the years preceding the First World War, 
to communists and pan-Arabists in the decades following the conflict. It was, however, 
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impossible to isolate Algerian society from these international developments. The global 
conflicts of the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution, the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 
formation of the United Nations all conditioned social interactions between the multiple 
groups within the colonial territory, and had far-reaching consequences on Algerian politics.      
As the articles in this special issue reveal, these six intersecting dynamics created the 
unstable realities of French Algeria; they also shaped a profound settler ambivalence to the 
political authority and cultural influence of the French state. This ambivalence in many ways 
surpassed that seen in other colonial territories where settlers necessarily oscillated between 
the need, on one hand, to maintain the privilege of the coloniser, and the appeal, on the other, 
of a process of indigenisation. Settler ambivalence was evident in the resurgent, simultaneous 
claims to French protection and colonial autonomy, which reached their violent apogee during 
the Algerian War. Throughout the colonial era, settlers weighed their desire for autonomy 
against their feelings of insecurity. Their calculations, which took place within the dynamics 
outlined above, were suffused with emotion: fear of the majority Muslim population, fear of 
Algerian Jews and their perceived political influence, anxieties over imperial rivalries in the 
neighbouring territories of Tunisia and Morocco, concerns over diplomatic tensions within 
Europe and their potential consequences for social relations amongst the European national 
groups in the colony, hopes and aspirations for colonial progress – the last of which often gave 
way to disappointment, anger and a sense of betrayal in the wake of decisions made in Paris. 
Caught between a desire to be recognised by the French of the metropole, and a desire to be 
recognised as different from the French of the metropole, the settler community at once loved 
and rejected its imperial guardian.  The development of settler ambivalence can be traced 
over five historical phases: 
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1830-1870: Invasion, Annexation and the Military Regime    
The conditions of settler ambivalence to French authority were established in the early phase 
of settlement, between the French invasion of Algiers – a semi-autonomous province of the 
Ottoman Empire – in 1830, and the fall of the French Second Empire, under Napoleon III, in 
1870.  These decades were marked by political instability and regime change in France, leading 
to an uncertain and inconsistent approach to the development of the conquered territory and 
the governance of its heterogeneous population. Faced with widespread Muslim opposition 
to the French presence, and a protracted and bloody struggle against the forces of Abd el-
Kader, the governments of the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies regularly expressed doubts 
as to the desirability of securing possession of Algeria. If these doubts had waned by 1848, 
following the defeat of Abd el-Kader, the proclamation of the Second French Republic, and 
the integration of the conquered territory into the administrative structures of the French 
nation, the question of governance provoked further anxieties. Although, as Jennifer Sessions 
notes, most French officials had come to see settlement as an extension of the relation of 
colonial domination established by military victory, there was little agreement as to the status 
of the growing numbers of non-French Europeans settling in the colony.17 These settlers, who 
were primarily of Spanish, Italian and Maltese origin and low socioeconomic status, 
outnumbered settlers of French origin in many areas of the colonial territory until the late 
nineteenth century.18  Alternately viewed as valuable sources of labour and disruptive agents 
of international competition, successive French governments hesitated to attribute French 
citizenship to foreign European nationals.19   
The ethnic and social origins of the settler population contributed to the 
characterisation of the settler colony by the French of the metropole as a place of 
questionable morality, a reputation which was further cemented by the exile to Algeria of over 
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6000 political criminals in the wake of the 1848 revolution and the 1851 Napoleonic coup 
d’état.20 Settlers reacted against what they perceived to be the dismissive attitudes of the 
metropolitan public, using early publications and professional associations to present 
themselves as local experts whose knowledge could be usefully mobilised by the French state 
– if coherent structures of colonial government could be established. Coherent structures, 
however, were not forthcoming. Although the colonial territory had been integrated into the 
administrative apparatus of the French state in 1848, these structures existed alongside those 
of the colonial General Government, established in 1834, and areas of military jurisdiction. 
Settler dissatisfaction with the governance of the territory was exacerbated over the course 
of the Second Empire as the French Army gained greater authority. Although the violence of 
military rule contributed to the massive demographic decline of the Arabo-Berber population 
during these years,21 settlers perceived military institutions such as the Bureaux Arabes – 
which mediated between the tribes and the state, and provided limited medical care to Arabo-
Berber communities – as ‘arabophile’. Settler hostility to the French Second Empire and its 
military regime intensified when, in 1863, Napoleon III outlined his vision of Algeria not as a 
colony, but as an ‘Arab kingdom’, and when, in 1865, the Emperor cleared the way for the 
accession to French citizenship of individual Algerian Muslims and Jews. Despite the fact that 
this legislation – which required Muslims and Jews to abandon their right to be governed by 
Koranic or Mosaic law in civil affairs – attracted few candidates for naturalisation, it 
nevertheless, as Todd Shepard explains, ‘gave institutional form to the promise of assimilation 
in Algeria’.22 
 
 
1870-1908: The Consolidation of Settler Authority 
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The collapse of the Second Empire in 1870 was widely celebrated by settlers, who saw the 
transition to the French Third Republic and the subsequent establishment of civil rule in 
Algeria as an opportunity to renegotiate their relationship with the French state and reaffirm 
their authority over Algerian Muslims and Jews. The years between 1870 and 1908 were 
marked by the consolidation of settlers’ ambivalent attitudes to French authority. This 
ambivalence was evident from the very beginning of the period as a revolutionary Commune 
emerged in Algiers, dedicated not only to the defense of the Third Republic from Prussian 
invaders and French monarchists, but also to the elaboration of projects by which settlers 
aimed ‘to take the destiny of Algeria into their own hands’.23 Settlers maintained their 
pressure on the French government throughout these decades through a strong colonial lobby 
in the French parliament, and gained further autonomy over their affairs through the 
temporary administrative changes of 1881-1896, and the creation of a permanent body – the 
Délégations financières – to allocate the colonial budget, in 1901.24 This increased autonomy 
facilitated the widespread appropriation of land, with devastating consequences for Algerians, 
particularly the nomadic pastoralist tribes.25 
Settler claims to autonomy in this era were increasingly supported by reference to a 
distinctive local cultural community. In their newspapers, their correspondence with the 
authorities, their professional associations and their early works of literature, settlers 
presented themselves as ‘Algerians’ and sought to define their particular traits and qualities. 
Traits frequently evoked by settlers included a rejection of the overly-civilised, ‘effeminate’ 
manners of Europeans on the other side of the Mediterranean, a plain-spokenness, a visceral 
bond with the Algerian soil, and a capacity to endure physical suffering. By the turn of the 
twentieth century settler demographers and doctors were referring to the ‘Algerian’ people 
as ‘neo-Latin’ or as a ‘new white race’, composed of an increasingly intermixed population of 
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Frenchmen, Italians and Spaniards.26 References to an ‘Algerian’ settler community or race did 
not, of course, negate the very real differentiation of social status amongst settlers of 
divergent national origins. Settlers of French origin, particularly those from Alsace-Lorraine, 
held a privileged position in colonial society, while those of Maltese origin were denigrated 
and ostracised.27 The imagination of an ‘Algerian’ community nevertheless proved useful to 
settlers in the wake of the 1889 law which effected the automatic collective naturalisation of 
Europeans born in Algeria, as many settlers struggled to balance their new political identity 
with their mixed cultural heritage. Invocations of an idealised ‘Algerian’ settler community 
likewise proved useful in the context of Franco-Italian rivalry in Tunisia, and Franco-Spanish 
competition in Morocco.      
Despite their drive for increased administrative and cultural autonomy, settlers were 
anxious to retain both the protection and the recognition of the French state. The 1871 revolt 
of 150,000 Muslims in Kabylia, led by El-Mokhrani, ensured that security remained a constant 
preoccupation of settlers in these decades.28 Beyond protection, however, settlers wanted 
the French of the metropole to understand and acknowledge the risks and sacrifices of 
settlement. Their hopes in this regard were frequently disappointed as metropolitan 
politicians and journalists – concerned about ‘foreign’ influence on settler mentalities, and 
prompted by the first generations of Muslim reformers – attempted to displace responsibility 
for colonial violence onto the settler community. The sense of betrayal felt by settlers faced 
with the criticism and misunderstanding of the French government and the French public was 
heightened by the failure of the government to resolve other perceived problems. These 
included the ongoing complexities of the dual administrative system, and the influence of 
Algerian Jews in colonial society following their collective enfranchisement by the republican 
government of 1870. These issues converged to fuel a small but militant separatist movement 
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in the late 1890s. Even settler separatism, however, was characterised by ambivalence: in the 
wake of the violent demonstrations of the turn of the century, former separatists admitted 
that their fleeting rejection of the French state had been founded on a desire to be better 
loved by the French nation.   
 
1908-1945: The Rise of Algerian Nationalism in an Era of Global Rights 
The limited autonomy gained by settlers in the wake of the violence of the 1890s and the 
establishment of the Délégations financières in 1901, was soon challenged by the French state, 
which proposed in 1908, to extend conscription to Algerian Muslims. Acutely conscious of the 
demographic imbalance between France and Germany, especially in terms of men of fighting 
age, the state sought to marshal resources in French Algeria and across the Empire. Settler 
leaders were horrified by this proposal, opposing the arming of Algerians on the basis that the 
new recruits could turn this military knowledge against settler rule. Furthermore, settlers 
feared that conscription could lead to Algerian demands for citizenship rights. Rejecting the 
proposal, numerous town halls refused to carry out the necessary census of the Muslim 
population, while Gaston Thomas, the deputy for Constantine in the National Assembly, 
resigned as Minister for the Navy. The settler press also mounted a vociferous campaign which 
intensified still further when, following the formal introduction of Muslim conscription in 
1911, middle-class Muslims calling themselves ‘Young Algerians’ drew up a Manifesto 
demanding enlarged suffrage for Algerians and representation in the French National 
Assembly. In June 1912 a delegation presented these demands in person to the Prime Minister 
Raymond Poincaré, immediately provoking further ire from settler journalists, who 
denounced the ‘Young Algerians’ as Ottoman spies.  
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The crisis of 1908-1911 crystallised tensions which continued to define the contours of 
French Algeria until 1946. The event affirmed the primacy of the interests of the French state, 
which had been willing to countenance reform – albeit always within a context of French 
sovereignty – in return for military resources. Indeed, the state proposed to give a small 
minority of Algerians greater rights as a reward for Muslim participation in the war effort. This 
reformist logic was also evident in later proposals to extend Muslim enfranchisement, albeit 
in a very limited way. Reforms proposed by the Popular Front in 1936 were actually 
implemented by de Gaulle in March 1944. These reforms, however, were greeted with 
hostility by settler leaders who saw their role as one of defending the status quo established 
in 1901. These leaders continually displayed an entrenched attitude, either sabotaging such 
reforms in the National Assembly through the colonial lobby or, if legislation was passed, 
dragging their feet and preventing the practical application of reforms on the ground. This 
pronounced conservatism also explains why the authoritarian Vichy regime received such 
widespread support amongst the settler population.  
The settlers’ fear of political change was driven in part by the demographic realities of 
the period. Between 1908 and 1946 the settler population remained constant, flat-lining at 
one million, while the Arabo-Berber population shot up to over seven million.  Many settlers 
felt outnumbered and consequently fearful about the future of French Algeria. Their fears 
were exacerbated by the fact that this population explosion was accompanied by another new 
factor: the politicisation of Muslim society. Politicisation was initially limited to a tiny minority 
of middle-class Muslims who wanted to ensure equality with French citizens. However, by 
1946, Muslim mass politics had become a reality, with political parties demanding not just 
greater rights, but full independence. This mass politics was defined by the language of 
political and human rights, with the wording of the 1912 Manifesto inspired by French 
15  
republicanism derived from the 1789 French Revolution. Subsequently, their demands would 
be shaped by the international language of human rights, notably the 1941 Atlantic Charter, 
signed by Roosevelt and Churchill and enshrining the national right to self-determination, and 
the formation of the United Nations. This move to a new mass politics was also influenced by 
developments in the Arab and Muslim world, specifically the Islamic Renaissance Movement 
and pan-Arab nationalism, which both opposed colonial rule in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The impact of the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Revolution and the two 
World Wars also contributed to this transformation. In this sense French Algeria could not be 
separated from global political developments, nor could it be separated from global 
economics. Indeed the impact of the 1930s global economic depression was crucial in 
radicalising Algerian politics.  
 
1945 to 1962: International Pressure and the Algerian War 
In May 1945 French Algeria witnessed mass political demonstrations by Algerian nationalists 
in all the major towns and cities. Anticipating the formation of the United Nations in San 
Francisco, these protestors wanted to show that the Algerian nation existed and was ready to 
take its place amongst the nation states of the world. On 8 May one demonstration in Sétif in 
eastern Algeria led to widespread anti-settler violence that resulted in the death of twenty-
one settlers. The event precipitated massive counter-violence from the French state as the 
Army re-established French rule across the Sétif region. Three years later the nationalist press 
would talk of 20,000 dead, while post-independence Algerian estimates have never been less 
than 45,000.  
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In many ways this violent moment contained all the hallmarks of the previous phase. 
Once again, the interests of the French state were paramount, as the government sought to 
reassert national sovereignty after the Nazi occupation. Settler fears of social and political 
change were also in evidence, faced with a self-confident Algerian nationalist movement 
which believed that Algerian independence was imminent. However, this moment was 
different in three crucial respects. Part of the nationalist movement was now committed to 
the violent overthrow of French Algeria. The newly-established United Nations, moreover, 
enshrined a clear decolonisation narrative – one where the demand for national self-
determination would led to a nation-state and a seat at the UN Assembly.  In addition to this, 
the geopolitical shift produce by the global conflict had produced two new super-powers – 
the USA and the USSR – both of which were resolutely anti-colonial.   
These new factors defined the final phase of French Algeria which led to Algerian 
independence in July 1962. Thus, in November 1954 the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
launched a national war of liberation that was based upon a strategy of violence. Over the 
next two years the FLN came to predominate over all nationalist rivals. Settler leaders and the 
settler community as a whole recoiled in horror at the FLN tactics and demanded protection 
from the French state. Settler intransigence grew as they monitored political developments in 
Paris, considering any possibility of negotiation between the French government and the FLN 
to be unthinkable. The position of the French state did, however, change. In 1956 the 
Republican Front government deployed massive resources – both military and economic – in 
an effort to reform French Algeria. The government sought to create greater equality in 
colonial society by enacting the political changes encapsulated in the 1947 statute, and 
thereby protecting French sovereignty at the expense of settler privilege. This strategy was 
based on the premise that a reformed French Algeria would become the lynchpin of a 
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Eurafrican bloc, which – combined with the imminent creation of the European Economic 
Community – would situate France as a geopolitical force to counter the USA and USSR. The 
French government also hoped to protect the gas and oil resources that had been discovered 
in the Sahara, as the basis of the country’s future economic strength.  
Yet, by April 1961 de Gaulle had come to the clear conclusion that French Algeria was 
no longer in the interests of the French state. Not only was the maintenance of colonial rule a 
strain on the French budget, but it was doing grave damage to France’s international image. 
Within the metropole, pressure to end the conflict mounted as the tide of public opinion – 
concerned about the fate of French conscripts – turned against further military involvement. 
Outside of France, calls to end the conflict were accompanied by pressure to initiate a process 
of decolonisation. The USA had repeatedly underlined that, in the context of the Cold War, 
French Algeria and its negative global perception posed a threat to the strength and credibility 
of NATO. By 1961, France was hopelessly isolated at the UN as all the newly-independent 
former colonies lined up to support the Algerian cause. For settlers, however, the effect of the 
new policy of decolonization was cataclysmic. As the French state sought to withdraw from 
Algeria, some settlers resorted to terrorism in the hope that they could prevent the definitive 
abandonment of their community.  Their actions fed into the bloody and chaotic denouement 
of French Algeria, which resulted in the mass exodus of the settlers.          
 
 
 
Post-1962: Memory Wars  
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For many historians, 1962 marks the end of France’s ambitions towards empire, and a 
definitive turn away from its identity as a colonial power and towards a new future in Europe.29 
Kristin Ross has persuasively argued that the move to post-war modernisation, facilitated by 
immigration from North Africa, quickly made colonialism seem ‘like a dusty archaism’ such 
that, like a classic case of Freudian repression, the war and the consequent loss of Algeria were 
soon forgotten by the general population.30 In tracing the afterlives of the war and the 
amnesia which has surrounded it, critics have adapted and applied Henry Rousso’s seminal 
psychoanalytic analysis of Vichy France, pointing to the ways in which the unhealed wounds 
of the war have demonstrated a propensity to re-emerge onto the public scene in the wake 
of events such as the Papon trial (1997-98), and the controversy surrounding the French 
army’s use of torture (2000).31 
In contrast to the amnesia and apathy among the general population, the post-war 
experience of the 800,000 or so settlers ‘repatriated’ to France in the summer of 1962 was 
very different. Received as colonisers and oppressors by the left wing, and resented generally 
for the cost, human and financial, of the war, they were traumatised by the loss of their 
homeland and struggled initially with the practical difficulties of finding accommodation and 
employment amidst public services overwhelmed by the number of arrivals. The 
consequences of the war were so far-reaching that, for many former settlers (now termed 
‘pieds-noirs’), it would prove impossible to move on. Their attachment to the now defunct 
colonial worldview, their sense of betrayal at de Gaulle’s putative abandonment, and their 
rejection by the Communist movement to which many settlers had once belonged, combined 
to draw together the once disparate political views of the settler collective in generalized 
support for the far right, pro-Algérie française politics of Tixier-Vignancour and, later, the 
National Front. Political mobilization followed: the cultural association, ANFANOMA, created 
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in 1956 by French settlers returning from Morocco and Tunisia, began the political campaign 
for the repatriates, initially focusing on indemnification for their material losses, and 
subsequently lobbying for symbolic public acknowledgement of the settlers’ suffering.32 
ANFANOMA was soon joined by a proliferation of cultural associations, which were frequently 
structured around the repatriates’ area of residence in Algeria and which sought to recreate 
the memories and culture of the colonial community. As the repatriate community has aged, 
the associations represent an ever-reducing fraction of settlers and their descendants; 
conversely, in order to amplify their demands for official state recognition the associations 
have been obliged to adopt a simplified narrative which elides the nuances of the historical 
experience. From these recreations of the Algerian settler community emerged the discourses 
of nostalgia (‘nostalgérie’) for their lost paradise (‘paradis perdu’), and representations of the 
settlers as innocent victims of Gaullist duplicity.  
This emerging narrative foregrounded the experiences of the European repatriates; it 
is notable that Algeria’s Jewish population, most of which was forced to leave in 1962 as part 
of the settler community, did not generally form part of the pied-noir community once back 
in France but instead integrated into France’s existing Jewish community or, in many cases, 
chose to leave for Israel. The narrative also excludes the thousands of settlers (the so-called 
‘pieds-verts’) who defied the ultimatum of ‘the suitcase or the coffin’, and who chose to stay 
in an independent Algeria, embracing the ideals of the new state. Many stayed only a few 
years, leaving for France in the course of the 1960s but not reintegrating into the repatriated 
settler community.  
The narrative established by the pied-noir associations, which highlighted in particular 
the violence (widespread kidnappings, and massacres in Algiers and Oran involving the French 
army) suffered by the community in the months leading up to independence, aimed to 
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counter the widespread perception of the repatriates as colonists and racists. These two 
versions of history played into wider debates taking place in France in the early twenty-first 
century concerning how those living in France should remember controversial periods of the 
country’s past, with certain constituencies, including writers such as Daniel Lefeuvre, Pascal 
Bruckner and Jean-Pierre Rioux, castigating the move to reassess the colonial past as part of a 
deplorable Western tendency towards intellectual self-flagellation.33 The debate took a 
juridical turn with the Taubira Law (2001) on the slave trade, which was followed by the Law 
of 23 February 2005, article four of which established the responsibility of teachers to present 
‘the positive role of the French presence in its overseas territories, particularly in North 
Africa’.34 Immediately controversial and later abrogated, this clause nonetheless testified to 
the success of the pied-noir lobby in achieving state recognition of its view of colonial history 
in Algeria. Indeed, arguably it signalled the high-water mark for the pieds-noirs in terms of 
succeeding in having their memories accepted within the official historiography: by 2012 and 
the commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of Algerian independence, the media in 
particular was concerned to reflect the spectrum of perspectives of those involved in the war, 
such that the pied-noir experience was relativised as merely one of many in a mosaic of 
memories.35  
In Algeria, independence was followed by the creation of an official historiography of 
the war which emphasized the heroic anti-colonial resistance of the Algerian people, and 
transformed the one million war dead into so many martyrs of the nation. The preservation 
of a single unified narrative of nationalist revolution with the FLN at its head elided the brutal 
internecine conflicts between rival nationalist groups that had led to thousands of Algerian 
deaths. Instead, France was presented as the sole enemy, and its settlers the embodiment of 
colonial evil, all traces of which had to be purged in order to ensure the survival of the Algerian 
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nation. Yet from the 1980s onwards cracks began to appear in the narrative as it was 
challenged from a number of directions. The economic difficulties experienced by other newly 
independent states such as Zimbabwe led many to question the feasibility of the better future 
promised by the regime, which also came under attack from the growing Islamist and Berberist 
movements; these appropriated the regime’s own strategy to accuse the military of having 
betrayed the ideals of the anti-colonial struggle and having become in their turn, hizb fransa 
(‘the party of France’).36 The violence of the conflict which followed, and which saw 
government forces as well as certain Islamist groups implicated in atrocities of unspeakable 
horror, has left a legacy of cynicism amongst a population denied any moves towards truth 
and justice. Bouteflika’s regime has continued to insist upon the narrative of liberation as the 
founding event of the new state, but increasingly this has been called into question by the 
efforts of academics, such as Benjamin Stora and Mohammed Harbi, from both Algeria and 
France, working to construct a common history of the Algerian war.37  In this way the memory 
wars over French Algeria have to be understood as a trans-national phenomenon where 
contemporary events in both countries shape and reshape remembering.  Thus, the unfolding 
bloodshed in Algeria from 1992 onwards was a crucial backdrop to public attempts within 
France to rehabilitate French Algeria, culminating with the 2005 Law.  Now pied-noir groups 
could point to the seeming implosion of post-independence Algeria in order to argue for the 
positive legacy of settler colonialism in French Algeria.  Equally, this perspective produced a 
vociferous reaction in Algeria.  Explicitly citing the 2005 Law President Bouteflika used the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Sétif massacre, in May 2005, to denounce France as a country in 
denial about colonial atrocities, even describing French actions as genocidal.   Similarly these 
specific memory wars have been moulded by the more general international narratives of 
remembering; one where the optimism of post-independence decolonisation in the 1960s and 
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1970s had given way by the 1980s to a much more pessimistic picture of corruption and failed 
promises.  
The tensions surrounding the incorporation of the settler experience within the 
national historiography speak to the ambivalence which has characterized the place occupied 
by the settlers within the French nation throughout the period of the colonization of Algeria. 
Homi Bhabha’s reference to the ‘ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space’ reminds us 
that French Algeria intersected only intermittently and awkwardly with the historical time of 
the French state.38 As critics such as Charles Forsdick have pointed out, the emphasis on the 
historiography of France as essentially Hexagonal has had the effect of creating ‘a certain idea 
of France’, one where the settlers found themselves accommodated only with difficulty.39 
Located on the periphery of the nation, the settlers were effectively semi-detached from the 
narrative vision of the state, producing the uncertainties and tensions which characterized 
relations with the metropole, and which feature in the articles in this issue. Settler anxieties 
emanated from the disconnect between the settlers’ sense of their own identity and future, 
and their perception of the powerful, civilized but moribund metropole, anxieties which 
resulted from the implicit racial and cultural hierarchies that stalked the insecure settler 
population, conscious of its mixed origins and demographic vulnerability. Vaunting its youth 
and vibrancy but always aware of the threat to French purity posed by uncultured elements 
from the range of exogenous Others, settler identity oscillated between demands for 
autonomy and the need for reassurance. The history of French Algeria is to a large extent the 
process of negotiating these demands, a process which came to an abrupt end in 1962 when 
the settlers’ liminal position at the margins of the state was dissolved. From then, the 
temporal disconnect became manifest, with the settlers cut off from the teleological progress 
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of the modern post-colonial nation, arguing their case for the past as it slips into what Bhabha 
calls ‘the “timeless” discourse of irrationality’.40  
To understand the history of Algeria’s settler colonialism requires an awareness of the 
complex dynamics which operated between the six competing centres of interest outlined 
above. The articles which follow are organized according to the chronology described above 
and engage with different facets of the settler colonial situation, tracing the dynamics as they 
evolve from the late nineteenth century through the crisis of independence to the present 
day. If the multi-dimensional model applied here serves to explore the particularities of 
Algeria’s exceptionalism, the expectation is that it will also provide a theoretical framework 
to analyse other settler colonial contexts and so contribute to the development of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the functioning of settler societies, past and present.  By 
opening up a research conversation between the histories of settler colonialism in the 
Anglophone and Francophone empires, the intention of this special issue is to move beyond 
the Anglophone examples that have framed the debate so far and open up the way to a 
globally connected and comparative history of settler colonialism that must also integrate a 
detailed consideration of the Lusophone and Hispanic worlds.  
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